Build out the home-lab OpenBAO deployment beyond the basic node: - docker-compose: add openbao-unsealer sidecar; main node now transit auto-unseals against it (seal config kept in gitignored config/seal.hcl) - policies/admin.hcl: non-root admin policy; per-engine rules for ssh/pki/pki_int/totp/transit - Internal two-tier CA (pki/ root + pki_int/ intermediate) issues the openbao.famfi.home leaf Traefik serves; root CA published under ca/ - scripts/ + systemd/: daily cert renewal and Raft snapshot backups (both instances), with scoped tokens stored outside the repo - README: full runbook (auto-unseal, PKI, renewal, backups, DR/restore) Secrets (init/unsealer keys, tokens, seal stanza) stay gitignored. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
OpenBAO — Home Lab Deployment
Single-node OpenBAO (v2.5.5) running via Docker Compose with integrated Raft storage. Suitable for a self-hosted home lab.
Layout
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
docker-compose.yml |
Main node + openbao-unsealer sidecar, Raft volumes |
config/openbao.hcl |
Main server config: Raft storage, TCP listener, UI |
config/seal.hcl |
Transit auto-unseal stanza (git-ignored — holds a token) |
config-unsealer/ |
Config for the transit unsealer instance |
policies/admin.hcl |
Non-root admin policy |
scripts/, systemd/ |
Automated cert renewal (timer + script) |
ca/ |
Internal root CA cert (public — for trusting on devices) |
1. Start the server
docker compose up -d
docker compose logs -f openbao # watch startup
The server starts sealed and uninitialized — this is expected.
2. Initialize (one time only)
This generates the unseal keys and the initial root token. Run it once.
docker compose exec openbao bao operator init \
-key-shares=5 -key-threshold=3 -format=json > init-output.json
⚠️ init-output.json contains your unseal keys and root token. Store them
in a password manager and delete the file afterward. It is git-ignored, but
treat it like the master key to everything — because it is.
3. Unseal — automatic (transit auto-unseal)
The main node auto-unseals via the openbao-unsealer sidecar (transit
seal, see "Auto-unseal" below). You normally never unseal it by hand. The
original 5 Shamir keys are now recovery keys (for root-token regen /
recovery operations), not unseal keys.
First-time bring-up only: a brand-new install is Shamir-sealed until you run
bao operator init+bao operator unseal(3 keys) once, before migrating to transit auto-unseal.
Auto-unseal (transit via the unsealer sidecar)
openbao-unsealer is a tiny second OpenBAO instance that holds one transit key
(autounseal). The main node's config/seal.hcl points at it and unwraps its
root key on every start — so main-node restarts/upgrades need no manual unseal.
main openbao ──seal:transit──▶ openbao-unsealer (transit/autounseal)
-
The unsealer itself is Shamir-sealed (1 key). Its key + root token are in
unsealer-init.json(git-ignored). On a full host reboot the unsealer comes up sealed, so unseal it once and the main node follows automatically:docker compose exec openbao-unsealer bao operator unseal <unsealer-key> -
Caveat: the unsealer currently runs on the same host (SPOF). For real separation, relocate it to another host and point
seal.hclat it. To make host reboots fully hands-off, give the unsealer its own boot-unseal.
4. Log in & use
Day-to-day: use the non-root admin user (userpass auth, admin policy).
Credentials are in admin-credentials.txt (git-ignored) — change the password
and move it to your password manager.
# Local CLI (plaintext API is bound to loopback only):
export BAO_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200
docker compose exec openbao bao login -method=userpass username=admin
# Break-glass only:
docker compose exec openbao bao login # paste the root token
The admin policy (policies/admin.hcl) grants full
day-to-day administration but not root-only operations (sys/raw, root-token
generation, rekey). Keep the root token offline.
Enabled secrets engines
| Engine | Path | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| KV v2 | secret/ |
static key/value secrets |
| SSH | ssh/ |
SSH CA — sign short-lived host/client certs (needs CA + roles configured) |
| PKI | pki/ |
internal CA, max lease 10y (needs root/intermediate CA generated) |
| TOTP | totp/ |
2FA code generation/validation |
| Transit | transit/ |
encryption-as-a-service (needs a key created) |
These are mounted but not yet configured (no CAs/keys/roles). Each engine mounted at a new path has a matching rule in policies/admin.hcl; add one per future engine.
docker compose exec openbao bao kv put secret/myapp/db password=s3cr3t
docker compose exec openbao bao kv get secret/myapp/db
Access via Traefik (LAN-only HTTPS)
OpenBAO is fronted by the Traefik stack (../Traefik) at
https://openbao.famfi.home — restricted to 192.168.0.0/16, TLS terminated
by Traefik (default self-signed cert).
- Traefik dynamic config:
/srv/TRAEFIK/etc/traefik/traefik.d/openbao.yml - Traefik reaches the container by name (
http://openbao:8200) over the sharedtraefik_proxyDocker network. - DNS action required: add an A record
openbao.famfi.home → 192.168.0.142(thewebsecureentrypoint IP) on your LAN DNS, or a hosts entry on clients. - The built-in web UI is served at https://openbao.famfi.home once DNS is set.
- TLS uses a trusted cert from OpenBAO's own internal CA (see PKI section
below) — once you install the root CA on a device, no browser warnings and
no
BAO_SKIP_VERIFYneeded.
Internal CA (PKI) & the openbao.famfi.home cert
OpenBAO runs a two-tier internal CA and issues the cert Traefik serves:
| Mount | Role | TTL |
|---|---|---|
pki/ |
Root CA (famfi.home Internal Root CA) |
10y |
pki_int/ |
Intermediate CA (famfi.home Intermediate CA) |
5y |
pki_int/roles/famfi-home |
issuing role for *.famfi.home |
90d max |
The leaf for openbao.famfi.home lives in Traefik at
/srv/TRAEFIK/etc/traefik/tls/openbao/ and is loaded via
/srv/TRAEFIK/etc/traefik/traefik.d/tls-openbao.yml.
Trust the CA on your devices (one time) using ca/famfi-home-root-ca.pem:
# Linux (Debian/Ubuntu family):
sudo cp ca/famfi-home-root-ca.pem /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/famfi-home-root-ca.crt
sudo update-ca-certificates
# macOS: add to Keychain and mark trusted. Windows: import to "Trusted Root CAs".
# Browsers (Firefox) use their own store — import there too.
Issue a cert for another .home service:
docker compose exec openbao bao write pki_int/issue/famfi-home \
common_name="gitea.famfi.home" ttl=2160h
Renewal is automated. scripts/renew-openbao-cert.sh re-issues the leaf and
reinstalls it for Traefik (rewriting traefik.d/tls-openbao.yml to force a
reload — changing the cert file alone does not trigger one). A systemd timer
(systemd/openbao-cert-renew.timer, installed to /etc/systemd/system) runs it
daily; the script no-ops until the cert is within 21 days of expiry. The scoped
renewal token lives at /etc/openbao-cert-renew.token (root-only).
sudo systemctl list-timers openbao-cert-renew.timer # next run
sudo /home/lutz/Projects/OpenBAO/scripts/renew-openbao-cert.sh --force # renew now
Backups (Raft snapshots) — automated
scripts/backup-raft-snapshots.sh snapshots both instances and prunes to
the newest KEEP (default 14). A systemd timer (openbao-backup.timer) runs it
daily at ~02:30. Snapshots land in /var/backups/openbao/{main,unsealer}/
(root-only, 0600). Scoped backup tokens: /etc/openbao-backup.token,
/etc/openbao-unsealer-backup.token.
sudo /home/lutz/Projects/OpenBAO/scripts/backup-raft-snapshots.sh # run now
sudo systemctl list-timers openbao-backup.timer # next run
⚠️ Backups are local to this Pi — if the disk dies you lose data and backups. Add an offsite copy (e.g. rsync the snapshot dirs to a Synology) for real DR. This is the most valuable next hardening step.
Disaster-recovery set (keep these together, offsite)
To rebuild from nothing you need all of:
- A
mainsnapshot and anunsealersnapshot (same run). unsealer-init.json— the unsealer's unseal key (without it the unsealer can't be unsealed, so the main node can't be transit-unsealed).init-output.json— the main node's recovery keys + root token.
Restore outline
# 1. Restore the unsealer, unseal it (so transit auto-unseal works again):
docker compose cp <unsealer.snap> openbao-unsealer:/tmp/u.snap
docker compose exec openbao-unsealer bao operator raft snapshot restore /tmp/u.snap
docker compose exec openbao-unsealer bao operator unseal <unsealer-key>
# 2. Restore the main node (it auto-unseals via the unsealer):
docker compose cp <main.snap> openbao:/tmp/m.snap
docker compose exec openbao bao operator raft snapshot restore /tmp/m.snap
Hardening checklist (before storing real secrets)
- Put TLS in front (Traefik, LAN-only, trusted internal-CA cert)
- Create a non-root admin policy + user; stop using the root token day-to-day
- Enable auto-unseal (transit via the
openbao-unsealersidecar) - Automate cert renewal (systemd timer)
- Move the root token + recovery keys offline (out of
init-output.json) - Schedule the snapshot backup (systemd timer, both instances)
- Copy snapshots offsite (e.g. rsync to a Synology) — backups are local-only
- Disable or encrypt swap on the host (OpenBAO 2.x dropped mlock support)
- (Optional) Relocate the unsealer to a second host; consider 3-node HA